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ABSTRACT1
This study attempts to describe the Turkish polit-
ical market and determine where and how Turk-
ish political parties are perceived by voters. The 
study uses a two-dimensional map to determine 
the voter perceptions of the parties in the Turkish 
political market based on a survey questionnaire 
applied to 400 young voters. It also investigates 
whether there are any major diff erences in the 
perception of parties in the political space based 
on voter ideologies. The study fi nds that young 
voters have clear perceptions of the positions of 
Turkish parties. It also fi nds that voter percep-
tions of parties vary based on voters’ ideological 
positions.
SAŽETAK2
Istraživanjem se nastoje opisati politička tržišta u 
Turskoj te odrediti gdje i kako glasači percipiraju 
turske političke stranke. Za to je korištena dvod-
imenzionalna mapa za određivanje percepcija 
glasača na turskom političkom tržištu, temeljem 
provedenog anketnog istraživanja na uzorku od 
400 mladih glasača. Nadalje, istražuje se posto-
je li u političkom prostoru važne razlike u per-
cepciji stranaka temeljene na ideologiji glasača. 
Istraživanje pokazuje kako mladi glasači imaju 
jasnu percepciju položaja turskih političkih stra-
naka, ali i da se percepcija stranaka mijenja ovis-































Political markets are highly competitive. A typical 
political market may include between two and 
more than a hundred political parties (PP) in a 
democratic country. A political market generally 
includes political parties with diff erent ideolog-
ical views, political values, policies, and policy 
positions. Some markets are more competitive 
than others, and they can consist of a variety of 
parties, some of which are very similar to each 
other. For instance, there are currently about 77 
political parties in Turkey, and it is sometimes 
very diffi  cult to distinguish one from another in 
terms of their world views, ideologies, policies or 
values. There are several parties almost in every 
market segment, which means that the market is 
very fragmented. Those parties have to compete 
with others from both their own and diff erent 
segments. In such a fragmented market, parties 
have major diffi  culties in diff erentiating them-
selves from others, as it is not easy to create a 
distinguished and unique party image. 
In such markets, competition takes place most-
ly by means of brands. A party is located in the 
best possible place in the market in order to oc-
cupy the most suitable and desired place in the 
voters’ minds on the basis of its positioning and 
targeting decisions. Then relevant marketing 
strategies are applied to obtain the highest (or 
desired) percentage of votes. However, these do 
not always work because the positioning and 
targeting decisions are decisions made by the 
party itself. On the other side of the coin are the 
voters. Questions such as where the voters see a 
political party in the market and how they per-
ceive it are equally important. In many cases, the 
offi  cial position of a political party in the market 
and the place where voters see it diff er consider-
ably. This is the issue of the diff erence between 
“reality” and “perception”. 
Perception is important in marketing because 
consumers buy goods and services based not 
only on their actual characteristics, but also on 
how they recognize them. It aff ects consum-
er satisfaction and experiences considerably 
(Zeithaml, 1998). Perception is an even more val-
id consideration for voters, who behave accord-
ing to how they perceive a political subject (e.g. 
a party, candidate or political issue). They pay 
attention to assess and interpret all sorts of mes-
sages, signs, advertisements etc., based on their 
perceptions of the political subject. Therefore, 
the way a party is perceived and the perceived 
diff erences between parties are important. 
Moreover, the level of importance of percep-
tion increases as the similarities between parties 
increase. In turn, their rivalry intensifi es and the 
perceived diff erences become more important.
In cases of high similarity between (political) 
products, the perceived diff erences among 
parties play a critical role. A political product is 
a complex product, and voters are little likely 
to compare all the features of similar products. 
They make decisions based on the most distin-
guishing features and the perceived diff erences, 
rather than the individual features of a product. 
Perceived diff erences can be observed among 
parties even if they occupy the same place on 
the continuum in ideological or policy terms 
(Kovačič, Hlebec & Kropivnik, 2002; Ekehammar 
& Sidanius, 1977). Some of the parties in the Turk-
ish political market can provide a good example 
of this. For instance, despite the fact that certain 
pairs of parties are almost the political twins that 
target the same voter segments with similar 
ideological and political views, they have been 
perceived quite diff erently by voters. Three ex-
amples of such pairs are D(Y)P and ANAP (both 
central right parties), CHP and DSP (both central 
left parties), and MHP and BBP (both nationalist 
parties). Each pair has competed fi ercely among 
themselves, and against others at the same time, 
for decades. In such cases, perception plays a 
critical role in determining the result. 
In forming perceptions, special notice should be 
given to political ideology. Political parties are 
formed on the basis of ideologies, values, beliefs, 
world views etc. Ideology is one of the most ef-
fective determinants of voter support. It helps 



























easily along the political spectrum (e.g. left, cen-
ter or right). Ideology is not only important for 
parties, but voters as well, because it forms a part 
of one’s identity and value system. It helps voters 
defi ne and describe themselves with respect to 
others. It also aff ects how one perceives a polit-
ical party. Hence, voting decisions are mostly a 
product of the voters’ perceptions. The “percep-
tion problem” is a serious one in political mar-
kets. The more competitive the political market 
gets, the more serious the problem becomes.
The purpose of this paper is to determine where 
and how the voters perceive the political parties 
in the political space of Turkey. Voter perceptions 
are determined based on a proposed two-dimen-
sional triangular perception map. This study con-
siders the specifi c nature of the Turkish political 
space and makes some evaluations regarding it. 
The paper is organized into fi ve main parts. The 
second part presents some background infor-
mation about the Turkish political market. The 
third part includes the material and the method-
ology used in the study. The fourth part includes 
discussions of the study’s fi ndings on voter per-
ceptions of party positions based on an analysis 
of the data collected. This section also presents 
the perceptions of party positions in relation to 
the voters’ positions. The last section consists of 
a summary and a conclusion.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Understanding the 
political market
Voters may have their own perceptions of a 
specifi c political party against its self-declared 
(offi  cial) political position. The party’s self-de-
clared position and the voters’ perceptions may 
coincide or diff er from each other. Since the vot-
er uses his/her own perception in voting, this 
is more valid and countable than the party’s 
self-declared position.
In understanding voter perceptions, fi rst one 
should understand the political space (the mar-
ket). So far, attempts to analyze the political space 
have mostly been limited to traditional left–right 
models, sometimes with some extensions; but 
those models do not take into account the cul-
tural, historical, and social structures of countries, 
implicitly assuming that the standard model is val-
id for all. Therefore, those models do not consider 
the above-mentioned dynamics in representing 
the political space (Van der Brug, 1999; Lipset, 
1959). That is why they are not suffi  cient or help-
ful enough to represent and understand the true 
nature of political markets and voter behavior in 
many countries; also, they have never been ful-
ly adopted in the analysis of politics in some of 
them, such as Turkey (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006).
Academics, journalists, politicians and even political 
experts are often surprised by election results and 
have diffi  culty understanding how and why voters 
vote for a specifi c party. For instance, the 1995 elec-
tions in Turkey, in which the religious Welfare Party 
(RP) won in the fi rst round, surprised many at the 
time. Besides their Western counterparts, a number 
of local politicians and political experts were also 
surprised by the results. The 2002 election results, 
in which the Ak Parti won with a large majority, 
aroused similar reactions from many experts. Sim-
ilar scenes are common in many other countries 
around the world. Hence, the political markets of 
those countries and their structural elements need 
to be studied more carefully in order for us to bet-
ter understand voter behavior.
There are a variety of elements that shape po-
litical space, with ideology, values, economics, 
culture and traditions to be outlined among the 
most infl uential of such elements. Of course, as a 
cultural item, religion also has a specifi c infl uence 
on shaping the political space of many, if not all, 
countries, but its eff ects seem to be neglected 
in the political market and political science liter-
ature. This is probably due to the fact that most 
of the literature is shaped by descriptions of the 
secular Western world, where religion is not as 
infl uential in shaping political markets and voter 






























According to some empirical fi ndings, religion is 
not the most infl uential factor in voting decisions 
(Polat & Külter, 2008) but it does carry consider-
able weight (Polat, Gürbüz & İnal, 2004, p. 88-89). 
Especially when combined with some other fac-
tors, such as social class, education, income etc., 
its eff ects may become more apparent. Religion 
creates a strong bond for the creation of a polit-
ical identity.  It has power among voters in many 
political markets, such as Turkey, Israel, India, Pa-
kistan and a number of others. Religion is a re-
sponsive theme for political parties to address, 
and such a convenient medium that has capillary 
depth in the public is diffi  cult to ignore. 
Surely, this does not mean that religiosity will be a 
valid dimension of the political markets of all coun-
tries, but there is evidence that it is a valid and es-
sential part of many. Research exploring religious 
affi  liation in diff erent countries has shown that the 
percentage of people who are affi  liated to a reli-
gious belief is comparably much higher than that 
of those not affi  liated to one (The Pew Research 
Center, 2012; Türkiye Değerler Araştırmasi - Turkey 
Values Survey, 2011). Therefore, any attempt that 
ignores the role of religion in the understanding 
of the political market and voter behavior will be 
incomplete, especially in the countries mentioned 
above and many others like them. However, this 
study is not one that explores only the role of re-
ligion in shaping political markets, but makes ref-
erence to it as a means to better understanding 
political markets and market dynamics.
The knowledge of political markets and the po-
sitions of parties are important for the under-
standing of voters’ perceptions, a party’s ideo-
logical position, voter attitudes and behaviors 
towards parties, and voter transitions from party 
to party. This issue has for a long time been dis-
cussed in the literature, mainly that of political 
science, (Pelizzo, 2010; Pellikaan, Honig & Busing, 
2005; Dinas & Gemenis, 2009; Hinich & Munger, 
1994; Van Deth & Geurths, 1989), which includes 
such models as the classical Downsian (Downs, 
1957) and the Horseshoe model (see Pellikaan, 
Vollaard & Otjes, 2007) to represent political 
space. For decades, it has been described in a 
uni-dimensional form, namely in terms of the 
left–right continuum (Bowen, 1975, p. 203; Laver 
& Hunt, 1992). This description has been accept-
ed widely not only by politicians and academ-
ics but also by voters; many of whom describe 
their ideas, opinions, political identity and posi-
tion based on this description. They also use the 
same model in perceiving and evaluating polit-
ical parties, candidates and a number of other 
political issues.3 The literature reports three main 
methods to determine parties’ positions on the 
left–right continuum: the Manifesto Research 
Group (MRG) method (Klingemann, 1995; Budge, 
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara & Tanenbaum, 2001), 
the expert survey method and the voter survey 
method (Pellikaan et al., 2005, p. 4; see also Van 
der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983; Van der Brug, 1997; Shi-
kano & Pappi, 2004). Among these, only the third 
method refl ects the voters’ own perceptions.
2.2. The Turkish political 
market and political 
tradition
Turkey, as a democratic country, has about 65 
years of experience in multi-party democracy in 
spite of some interruptions. The Turkish experi-
ence, with its success in developing democratic 
institutions, an open society and a functioning 
democratic system, is a special case in its region 
that shows the integration of Islamic culture 
and democracy. However, behind this success 
lies the country’s unique experience and back-
ground, which stands on its own political and 
cultural roots, a point that is disregarded in many 
research studies. Without understanding the ba-
sis on which Turkish democracy has developed, 
it would be diffi  cult to draw clear conclusions. 
For instance, approaching the Turkish political 
market with traditional descriptions to be found 
in the literature would give us only a limited and 
unclear picture of it. Therefore, the country-spe-
cifi c features and the underlying background are 
needed to better understand the Turkish politi-



























In Turkish politics, most of the current political 
views and traditions have roots going back to 
the early 1900s (toward the end of the Ottoman 
period), which refl ects a long political experi-
ence in the modern sense. In this experiential 
frame, one can trace the ideological roots of al-
most all current parties – nationalists, socialists, 
social democrats and conservatives – to that 
time. Most of the current political streams have 
strong traditions that hark back to the late 1800s 
or early 1900s. In fact, they still maintain their ex-
istence on the current political space by shaping 
it.  These basic political streams are Ottomanism 
(Osmanlicilik), Islamism (İslamcilik), Nationalism 
(Turkism; Türkçülük) and Modernism (Çağdaşlik/
Muasirlik) (Demirağ, 2005; Helvaci, 2010; Yilmaz, 
2011; Dagi, 2005) (Graph 1).
The traditional left–right dimension is also used 
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Graph 1: Main political thoughts and movements in Turkish politics






























the fact that it ignores many country-specifi c 
attributes. Every country has its own political 
traditions that are shaped by the country’s po-
litical roots, culture, social structure, and social 
and economic dynamics. All of these have great 
infl uence on voter behavior and cannot be ig-
nored.
In the multiparty period (after the 1950s), there 
have been two main centers in Turkish politics, 
namely, the center-right and the center-left. 
The center-right is represented by the conser-
vative right parties, including DP, AP, ANAP-DYP 
and Ak Parti, while the center-left is formed 
around the conservative CHP, the pro-Atatürk 
(Atatürkçülük) party, the State ideology. The 
votes are divided between the right and left 
wings of the political spectrum as 65-70% to 
25-30%. The center-right has been the most in-
fl uential line in the political market in the last 65 
years. It is conservative in nature with Western 
tendencies, but has the capacity to include dif-
ferent non-extremist ideological colors ranging 
from liberals to nationalists and religious parties 
as well. The last link of the chain is the Ak Parti 
(Justice and Development Party), established in 
2001 and labeled as pro-Islamist by many both 
inside (Boyraz, 2011) and outside the country, 
especially in the Western world, although it has 
declared itself as a conservative democratic 
party (Karakaş, 2007).
Additionally, the Turkish political market is highly 
competitive. Today, it consists of about 77 par-
ties, many of which take part in elections. Only 
about fi ve to seven of them get considerable 
percentages of the votes (Graph 2). The political 
market includes parties from diff erent ideolog-
ical dimensions, ranging from communist to 
ultra-nationalist and from liberals to the ultra-re-
ligious. The multiparty system is well-received 
and well-understood by Turkish voters. The 
majority of the electorate votes very conscious-
ly and are able to distinguish between parties, 
such as which party is situated where, as has 
been demonstrated by election results many 
times in the past.
3. METHOD
3.1. Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to determine young 
voters’ perceptions of political parties in Turkey, a 
country with a young population, where young 
voters have considerable weight in the political 
market. From this aspect, the purpose is three-
fold: to determine (i) how young voters perceive 
and map the major parties in a two-dimensional 
political space, (ii) neighboring positions among 
the parties from the voters’ perspective to iden-
tify possible voter transitions among parties, and 
(iii) whether voters with diff erent ideological ori-
entations perceive political parties’ diff erently.
3.2. Measuring tool
A specifi c questionnaire form was developed for 
the study, based on the literature. The form con-
sisted of three main parts, in which the fi rst one 
included fi ve multiple-choice questions about 
voter demographics; the second one included 
two Likert-type scales and fi ve Yes/No questions, 
aimed at determining the level of political in-
terest and involvement in politics; and the third 
one included questions about the perceived 
positions of political parties and voters’ self-de-
fi ned political positions on a Triangular Percep-
tion Map (TPM) specifi cally adapted for the study 
in light of the discussions in the literature and 
Turkish political traditions to measure the voters’ 
relative perceptions of the political party’s po-
sitions (Graph 3). A table including the parties’ 
offi  cial full names, emblems and acronyms was 
also provided to the respondents besides the 
TPM. (Before application, the form was supplied 
to several experts – a professor of sociology, a 
professor of political science and two professors 
of marketing, in order to check the validity. It was 
revised on the basis of the comments and sug-
gestions obtained from those experts. Later, a 



























to fi nd out whether the form included any fuzzy 
expressions etc. The data from the pilot study was 
not included in the analyses because the purpose 
was just to test the instrument. After fi nal revisions, 
the form was used in collecting the required data. 
Finally, the Likert-type items were tested for reli-
ability and Cronbach’s alpha was computed (α = 
0.796). Given that, as a rule of thumb, a reliability 
coeffi  cient of .80 is considered “good” in most cas-
es, the coeffi  cient of 0.796 suggests relatively high 
internal consistency).
The TMP consisted of “left–right” and “religios-
ity” dimensions in light of the traditional political 
streams, which have strong historical, political 
and cultural backgrounds in Turkey. Religion has 
always been an infl uential factor in Turkish poli-
tics, its eff ects on voter decisions are discussed in 
the literature (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006; Çarkoğlu & 
Hinich, 2002; Kalaycioğlu, 2007). Çarkoğlu & Hinich 
(2002) attempted to estimate the spatial positions 
of all major Turkish parties in a two-dimensional 
ideological space, namely pro-Islamism vs. sec-
ularism and Turkish nationalism vs. Kurdish na-
tionalism, claiming that these dimensions are in 
line with Mardin’s center-periphery framework 
(Mardin, 1973). They utilized the spatial theory of 
Hinich & Munger (1994), but there are not many 
studies yet that have utilized it to determine how 
religiosity aff ects voter perceptions.
Based on the historical political traditions, 
thoughts and their interrelations, the TMP has 
been shaped in the form of a right triangle. The 
left-most corner has been referred to as “commu-
nist”, the right-most corner as “ultra nationalist” 
and the top corner as “ultra-religious”. The reason 
the TPM is a triangle of such form is that the ideo-
logical distance between the left and the religious 
is greater than the distances between the left and 
nationalism and between nationalism and reli-
giousness, a view which is supported in the litera-
ture. In general, the leftists are more secular than 
the rightists, and they are more distanced from re-
ligion than are the nationalists, a fi nding sustained 
by several public surveys in Turkey. This is repre-
sented by the hypotenuse in the TPM having the 
longest distance between the two corners.
The TMP has been divided into 15 sub-regions, in 
which point 0 represents the very political center, 
which is a very common phrase in Turkish poli-
 






























tics. In fact, point 0 is only a hypothetical center 
that refers to an assumed point of reference. In real 
life, the center corresponds to an area or position 
that can embrace and attract voters from diff er-
ent ideological positions. 
On the TPM, while the areas 1, 2 and 3 represent 
the “center-right”, the areas 4, 5, and 6 represent 
the “center-left”. From this view, the center is a 
combination of several diff erent ideological col-
ors or sub-regions, which are diff erent from each 
other politically but, at the same time, similar to 
each other in terms of the moderateness of polit-
ical views. It is a mix of diff erent colors, including 
left, right, religious secular etc. The center is also 
helpful both in terms of identifying the relevant 
positions of parties and being the point of bal-
ance in politics. Thus, it is not a coincidence that 
the center- right or cetre-left parties generally ad-
dress the majority of the voters in many countries. 
The corners include the most extreme ideological 
positions (ultra-left – area 15, ultra-right – area 14, 
and ultra-religious – area 13). The areas between 
the extremes and the center (areas 7, 9, and 11) 
represent political positions with strong colors 
but non-extremes, such as religious (7), nationalist 
(9) and socialist (11). Beyond those, the TMP also 
includes shared areas representing multi-poled 
views, which are frequently observed in Turkish 
politics, such as ‘religious-nationalists’ (8), the ‘na-
tionalist-left’ (10) and the ‘religious-left’ (12), the 
last one being observed not as a political party 
but as voters in the Turkish market.
3.3. Population and data
Turkey is a country with a population of approx-
imately 76,668,000 (as of December 31, 2013) 
according to the Statistics Institute of Turkey 
(TÜİK). The median age is 30.4; 24.6% of the pop-
ulation is in the 0–14 age group and 67.7% is in 
the 15–64 age groups, while only 7.7% is 65 or 
over. Finally, 50.6% of the population is under 30 
years of age, and at least 80% lives in cities (Hür-
riyet Daily, 2014). These fi gures point to a very 
young population. The voting age is 18, and the 
minimum age for election to public offi  ce is 25. 
The general elections are held every four years; 
therefore, anybody who is 14 years old or over 
is the natural voter in the very next elections. At 
least 25% of the population is in the 15–30 age 
group, and they can be defi ned as young voters. 
Their numbers in relation to the total population 
are signifi cant enough to be able to aff ect the 
results of an entire election. That is why no party 
can ignore them, their preferences, demands or 
expectations. This makes how and where they 
perceive a political party as being “important”.
In principle, the target population of this study 
includes all the young voters at Turkish univer-
sities, at which about 3 million students are en-
gaged in formal education. However, a survey on 
such a comprehensive population would be too 
diffi  cult to carry out with limited resources (e.g., 
time, labor, fi nancing etc.). Hence, the study was 
designed to focus on the students at Niğde Uni-
versity as a case study. Niğde, a city with a pop-
ulation of around 115,000, is located in central 
Turkey and had a student population of about 
14,000 at its four major faculties at the time of 
the study, which by Turkish standards is a large 
university population. Its student population is 
quite heterogeneous in terms of location, mean-
ing that students come from almost all parts of 
the country.
To determine the sample size, the formula in Na-
kip (2006, p. 233) and Kurtuluş (2004, p. 191) were 
used. With a 95% confi dence level, a 5% error rate 
and a 0.50% population rate, the calculation pro-
duced the required minimum sample size of 384, 
an acceptable fi gure for such a study. In choos-
ing the sample elements, a multi-stage sampling 
procedure was applied. In the fi rst stage, it was 
decided to choose an approximate sample of 
400 voters, distributed proportionally among 
the faculties based on the number of students 
studying at each one. In the second stage, some 
of the classes at the faculties were chosen ran-
domly. The data was collected on the basis of a 
paper-based face-to-face survey questionnaire 



























carried out at the faculties just before the fi nal 
general elections, which were held during the 
same week.
4. FINDINGS AND 
DISCUSSION
4.1. Sample characteristics 
The characteristics of the sample are important 
in understanding and interpreting the research 
fi ndings. That is why, fi rst, some of the demo-
graphic features of the sample were determined 
as follows: 66% were male and 34% were female, 
with about 97% single respondents and 80% un-
der the age of 23; approximately 35% came from 
the Economics and Administrative Sciences Facul-
ty, 21% from the Science and Letters Faculty, 17% 
from the Architecture and Design Faculty, and 
28% from the Education Faculty. Similarly, about 
19% were fi rst-, 36% second-, 22% third- and 18% 
fourth-year students, while the remaining 6% 
were students in their fi fth year (or higher). 
Secondly, the degree of young voters’ interest in 
politics was required in order to understand how 
much they are interested in political topics and 
pay attention to the political goings-on (activi-
ties, news, circumstances etc.) around them. Un-
derstandably, low interest means low attention 
to politics; however, young voters look very inter-
ested in it. According to the fi ndings, while 55% 
of the voters were interested in politics at least 
to a medium or higher degree, 84% are interest-
ed in politics at least to some degree. In Turkey 
voters’ interest (including that of young voters) in 
politics or political topics is generally quite high 
(Çiftçi, 2013). These fi ndings support the existing 
literature.
Thirdly, the questionnaire examined whether 
the young voters felt closer to any political party, 
which could be taken as an indicator of “the de-
gree of interest” and “the level of involvement” 
in politics, both of which are factors that refl ect 
political awareness and, in turn, aff ect voter per-
ception. According to the fi ndings, most of the 
voters feel closer to a political party. While about 
50% of the voters feel in favor of a political party 
at least to a medium or higher degree, a mini-
mum of 77% feel some degree of closeness to a 
political party. These fi ndings highlight that the 
majority of the sample is involved at least emo-
tionally in politics.
Fourthly, in order to understand their attitude to-
ward and familiarity with politics, the question-
naire asked whether the young voters had al-
ready voted in a previous (local or general) elec-
tion. This is meaningful for learning their degree 
of (i) interest, (ii) involvement, and (iii) experience 
in politics (to a certain extent). Voters who have 
already voted in an election can be assumed to 
be more interested, more involved and more 
experienced in politics (and/or political subjects 
and aff airs) or to have higher tendency to it com-
pared to those who have not voted before. Ac-
cording to these fi ndings, about 40% of the sam-
ple had voted in an election before. This fi gure is 
considerable given that probably a major part of 
the young voters had not yet reached voting age 
in the last election. Therefore, the fi gure of 40% 
was a signifi cant portion of young voters to have 
political experience, interest and involvement.
A fi nal point to consider in this context is the sig-
nifi cance of the ideological position of a party 
in voting decisions. In other words, the question 
was whether or not the spatial position of a par-
ty, the place where a party positions itself in po-
litical space, is important for young voters when 
they vote. If it does matter for the majority of the 
voters, it shows that voter perceptions are a ma-
jor factor in voting decisions, indicating a polar-
ized market consisting of voters with higher po-
litical drives and party perceptions that are prob-
ably less changeable in the short-term. In such a 
market, it would be relatively diffi  cult for parties 
to gain market shares from others, because vot-
ers mostly do not change their preferences un-
less there is a strong cause, which is supposed to 
be off ered by the competing parties. Producing 






























ry for competition and the responsibility of the 
political decision-makers; but, prior to this, their 
primary task has to be to determine how and 
where their party is perceived in the political 
market prior to giving clear and neat messages 
to produce a stronger image about the party 
and its ideological position. The fi ndings indicate 
that for a minimum of 73% of the voters, a party’s 
spatial position is important at least to a medium 
or higher degree, and only for the remaining 17% 
is it “only a little bit” important. When taken to-
gether, the fi gures add up to 90%, indicating that 
for the vast majority of the voters a party’s politi-
cal position is signifi cant in voters’ decisions. This 
is a noteworthy fi gure, and no party can ignore 
such a fi gure in its marketing decisions.
An additional point investigated was whether 
there was any connection between the political 
orientations of young voters’ families and their 
own political inclinations. The questionnaire form 
included three Yes/No type questions that ask if (i) 
the voters’ family feels itself to belong to any po-
litical line, (ii) the voter feels that he/she belongs 
to any political line, and (iii) that his/her political 
line is the same as his/her family’s. The survey re-
sults indicate that, while about 60% of the voters’ 
families are oriented toward a political party, in-
terestingly, about the same percent of the voters 
are oriented toward a party. The results regarding 
the third subject clarify the issue further, indicat-
ing that about 69% of the voters have the same 
political inclinations as their families. In fact, this 
is not surprising because children get their fi rst 
political education, experiences and information 
from their own families, together with a harmony 
of other values.  Probably the degree of transfer-
ability of political values within the family is high-
er, and young voters are more inclined (and more 
likely) to accept their families’ political values and 
preferences. The fi ndings also show that the polit-
ical conscience and awareness are very high in the 
sample, which is parallel to the general character-
istics of the electorate in Turkey.
In a quick visual inspection of Graph 4, one sees 
that the voters are heavily concentrated on the 
right side of the map. If one looks at the dimension 
of religiosity, the voters are seen to be positioned 
in the upper corner of the triangle. These fi ndings 
are consistent with the current political split in 
Turkey and are also supported by various public 
surveys performed at diff erent times, such as Tür-
kiye Değerler Araştırmasi (2011). According to that 
survey, the majority of the Turkish electorate was 
positioned in the right of the political spectrum, 
and 81% of the people defi ned themselves as re-
ligious. Moreover, 92% of those surveyed stated 
that religion was important for them.
A further point of interest was the voters’ own 
political positions. This was relevant for three 
reasons: (i) to check if the fi ndings regarding the 
importance of spatial position of a party in vot-
ing and that the degree of voters’ political incli-
nation toward a party are consistent, (ii) to deter-
mine how the voters describe their own political 
positions, and (iii) to interpret the survey results, 
the fi ndings of which can only be interpreted 
within the voters’ own frame of reference. Due to 
these reasons, the issue has been addressed and 
the results are presented in Table 1 and Graph 4.




























In this survey, 29.6% of the voters are positioned 
in the center. Of these, only 6% are on the cen-
ter-left (in areas 4, 5 and 6), which is primarily 
composed of the right-wing voters. Of all the 
voters, only 26.3% are on the left (in areas 4, 5, 6, 
10, 11, 12 and 15) while the remaining 73.7% are 
on the right. This is consistent with the traditional 
left–right split in Turkey, as the last general elec-
tion results (2011) show, in which the leftist CHP 
received 25.9% of the votes and the percentages 
of other leftist parties were negligible. (The sam-
ple represents the population in Turkey quite 
well, catching the traditional 70–75% vs. 25–30% 
left–right split.) Similarly, 54.2% of the voters po-
sitioned themselves in the “more religious” areas 
(including areas 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13).
So far, the fi rst results indicate that the distribu-
tion of the voters’ own positions on the political 
spectrum is distributed unevenly, as would be 
expected from the traditional political split in Tur-
key. However, these fi ndings may highlight some 
other issues regarding the perception of party 
positions because it is diffi  cult to assume that the 
perception of parties is independent of where the 
voters themselves are in the political spectrum. 
This issue requires further investigation, but fi rst, 
where voters in general see the parties in the po-
litical market should be examined. 
5. THE PERCEIVED 
POSITIONS OF TURKISH 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
5.1. General picture
It has been pointed out that sometimes “how 
something is perceived becomes more import-
ant than what it is in reality.” This is more valid 
for political subjects than probably many other 
things. Being perceived on their own terms and/
or in the way they expect is very important for 
political parties because most of their decisions 
and activities are based on the assumption that 
the voters perceive them in the way that they 
anticipate. However, this assumption may or may 
not hold true at all.  Perception largely depends 
on the voter, on whom the political party has 
very little eff ect, especially when he or she has 
some sort of established perception of it from 






























the start. However, how and where a party is per-
ceived to stand has some concrete eff ect on the 
political decision-makers such that they may or 
may not be able to deliver their messages to vot-
ers eff ectively, or they may devise right/wrong 
strategies and decisions accordingly. Moreover, if 
voters perceive the political position of a party to 
be ideologically unacceptable to them, they may 
not vote for them at all. Based on the importance 
of the issue, detailed positional graphs for each 
of the parties whose political positions are seen 
clearly in the political space are presented below.
voters who position it in diff erent areas are rela-
tively high and its main characteristic is its “religi-
osity”, but it is not seen as a “radical” party. That 
positions are mainly spread over the “0–13–14 
sub-triangle” can be seen both in the perceived 
diff erences existing in the minds of young voters 
and in the span of the voter base of the party 
in the right dimension (see also Table 3 in the 
Appendix). At the moment, Ak Parti is the only 
party that is able to combine “religious”, “nation-
alist–religious”, “nationalist” and “liberal” voters in 
its membership at the same time. The fact that 
 
Graph 5:  Perceived positions of the Ak Parti (Justice and Development Party)
Graph 5 shows the ruling Ak Parti’s perceived 
positions. The party is seen as completely on 
the right by young voters. In fact, it is seen on 
three diff erent axes. The fi rst is the axis running 
through areas 0, 1, 7 and 13, which corresponds 
to the “religious line”, on which the degree of 
religiosity increases from 0 to 13. The second 
axis is the line running through areas 0, 2 and 8, 
which corresponds to the “nationalist–religious 
line”. The third is the axis running through areas 
0, 9 and 14, which corresponds to the “national-
ist line”. The strongest is the religious axis, while 
the weakest is the nationalist axis. The graph in-
dicates that the voters’ minds are very clear and 
neat about the Ak Parti. It is perceived as being 
located on the “right”, the percentage of the 
it won almost 50% of the votes in the 2011 elec-
tions testifi es to this.
Graph 6 shows where CHP is perceived on the 
political map. The voters’ perceptions are very 
clear-cut when it comes to the CHP, as well. 
They perceive it mostly along the axis running 
through areas 0, 5, 11 and 15. The majority of the 
voters surveyed identify it as a leftist party (plac-
ing it in area 11), while a considerable number 
perceives it either as a center-left or even a rad-
ical-left party (see also Table 3 in the Appendix). 
A similar situation is also valid for the Ak Parti, 
which is considered a “radical religious” party. 
A noticeable number of voters also identify the 



























CHP has indeed had such a mission in its recent 
history. It is diffi  cult to expect that all the voters 
perceive a specifi c party only in a certain area, in 
which case such a party would only be an ideo-
logical one with hard lines, but such a situation 
would be very diffi  cult for mass parties, such 
as the CHP or the Ak Parti. In general, the voter 
perceptions of the CHP look very specifi c, clear, 
combined, and well-determined.
Graph 7 is about the MHP, which is known as an 
ultra-nationalist party. It is perceived along two 
main axes: the 0–2–8 axis and the 0–9–14 axis. 
Surprisingly, the former is stronger than the lat-
ter, which means that by a large portion of the 
voters perceive the MHP as a “nationalist–reli-
gious” party rather than a purely nationalist one. 
In this regard, the voters’ perceptions are similar 
to those of the BBP, a party that separated from 
the MHP in 1992 due to claims of ideological dif-
ferences, some of which became more apparent 
later, such as the MHP’s being more religious. 
The BBP is considered a “nationalist–religious” 
party. In this regard, the MHP and the BBP are 
Graph 6:  Perceived positions of the CHP (Republican People’s Party)
 































perceived as being similar to each other, and 
the MHP has not distinguished itself from the 
BBP yet (or vice versa). (No graph for the BBP has 
been included here for reasons of space.).
Another party to point out is the DTP/BDP, a so-
cial(ist) (democratic) and nationalist Kurdish eth-
nic party (Graph 8). The voters place it along the 
single 0–5–11–15 axis, the leftist line. (This is the 
same axis that the CHP is on, but this is an eth-
nic party, and its voters have always been able to 
distinguish it from the CHP. However, extra tools 
are needed to distinguish these two parties on 
this map.). In fact, this is the estimated line for 
that party, and young voters are quite clear in 
their minds about this.
The fi nal party is SP, an ultra-religious party 
(Graph 9). The voters place it on the axis run-
ning through areas 0, 1, 7 and 13, the “religious 
line”. While almost half of the voters perceive this 
party as “ultra-religious”, the other half see it as 
 
Graph 8: Perceived positions of the DTP/BDP (Democratic Society Party / Peace and Democracy 
Party)



























“moderately religious”. In general, the voters are 
very clear in their minds about this party, too. It 
is possible to analyze the other parties that exist 
in today’s political arena as well, but these main 
parties are suffi  cient for the purpose of this study.
The results demonstrate that the parties are not 
evenly distributed on the map, which indicates 
that voters have diff erent positional perceptions 
of them. To put it more clearly, young voters 
properly distinguish every single party from 
each other and suitably place them in the politi-
cal space. They recognize all the parties in diff er-
ent locations. This indicates that the voters have 
very clear perceptions of political parties in their 
minds and are very aware of their ideological po-
sitions in the market.
5.2. Party positions according 
to voters’ political 
positions 
Up to this point, this article has discussed where 
voters perceive Turkish political parties on a two 
dimensional map, but the discussions have fo-
cused on the analyses of the whole sample. In 
other words, the graphs refl ect the sample’s av-
erage perceptions. But it is not known yet if the 
perceptions of the voters with diff erent political 
orientations show any diff erences from the aver-
age. To clarify this point, the data was investigat-
ed further, taking a closer look. Voter positions vs. 
perceived party positions were cross-tabulated in 
order to detect where voters with specifi c posi-
tions perceive the parties.
Graph 10 presents the perceptions of the Ak 
Parti by voters with diff erent political positions. 
It is clear that voters who have diff erent political 
alignments perceive the Ak Parti quite diff erently 
from each other.  For instance, while the voters 
who declared themselves as in the  political cen-
ter see it mostly in areas 1 and 7 (central 1 and 
religious), voters who declared themselves in the 
“nationalist–left” and “left” categories see it in 
areas 7 and 13 (“religious” and “ultra-religious”). 
(The six areas indicating the political center in 
the TMP are already combined together as “cen-
ter” in the analyses for our purpose and for sim-
plicity.). Surprisingly, most of the ‘radical religious’ 






























voters also see the Ak Parti in areas 7 and 13, 
which is parallel to the perceptions of the “left-
ists” and the “nationalist–leftists”. These groups 
probably see the Ak Parti in the same positions 
for diff erent reasons, the former probably feeling 
far from the Ak Parti,  and the latter feeling closer 
to the Ak Parti. (Detailed fi gures are given in Ta-
ble 2.1 in the Appendix).
Likewise, a similar picture is also valid for the CHP 
(Graph 11) and the other parties. For those as 
well, voters evaluating their own positions diff er-
ently evaluate the positions of parties diff erently 
from each other.  For instance, voters in the cen-
ter mainly see the CHP in areas 5 and 11 (center 
and left), while those on the right see it mostly 
in area 11. Voters who themselves are located in 
area 10 (nationalist–leftists) see the CHP in 10 and 
11. Moreover, voters in 11 also see it mostly in 5 
and 11, as those in the area 13 (radical–religious) 
see it mostly in 10 (nationalist–left) and 11 (left). 
In fact, the majority of the voters see the CHP in 
its main locations, but there are also some major 
diff erences between where voters see it based 
on their own positions. The corresponding ta-
bles (2.2 to 2.6) for the other major parties should 
be read accordingly.
6. SUMMARY AND 
CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated young voters’ per-
ceptions of political parties in the Turkish political 
market based on a two-dimensional triangular 
perception map. Evidence has been drawn from 
an original survey conducted on young voters at 
a university in Turkey as a case study. The analyses 
were performed based on both the aggregate 
level and voters’ self-defi ned positions. The study 
sample has produced very close results to the 
left–right split in Turkey in terms of voter positions 
(70–75% right and 25–30% left). The sample looks 
like a good approximation of the population.
The study reveals fi ndings that are worth noting, 
as follows: 
The majority of the Turkish political parties inves-
tigated appear to be very successful at market 
 



























positioning, so they are well represented in the 
minds of young voters who have high political 
awareness. The perceived positions of these par-
ties are very clear and neat in the minds of voters. 
This is a refl ection worth noting for the political 
parties, especially when one takes into account 
that there are more than 75 parties in the Turkish 
political market. In such a competitive market, it 
is a real success for parties to have such clear pic-
tures of their political positions.  
The fi ndings also reveal that voters with diff er-
ent ideological positions have diff erent percep-
tions of the other parties. This means that vot-
ers position political parties based on their own 
individual political orientation. In other words, 
voters’ perceptions of parties are subject to the 
political views of those voters. Therefore, a par-
ty must have a good understanding of how it is 
perceived by voters with diff erent political orien-
tations, and thus it must develop its strategies 
accordingly. This fi nding alone is an important 
contribution to documenting the perceptional 
diff erences among voters with diff erent ideolog-
ical points of view.
Young voters in Turkey are highly interested in 
politics. They have their own ideas about and 
attitudes toward diff erent political parties. They 
are capable of appropriately placing the parties 
in on the map. In general, they are very clear and 
neat about the ideological positions of even sim-
ilar parties, and are able to distinguish even the 
smallest diff erences among them. 
The Turkish political market also has its own 
specifi c features, just as any other country does. 
In order to understand a political market suffi  -
ciently, the country-specifi c factors should not 
be ignored in the market representation. In this 
study, a two-dimensional TPM has been used 
to present the voters’ perceptions of the politi-
cal market. The clear and neat pictures of party 
positions that were obtained show that the map 
used is a suitable refl ection of the Turkish po-
litical space. Therefore, besides the uni-dimen-
sional “left–right” continuum, “religiosity” should 
also be added to the dimensions of the political 
space in order to better understand the Turkish 
political market (as well as others like it). 
The study also produced important fi ndings 
and suggestions, especially for political deci-
sion-makers, political strategists and political 
marketers. These are given below:
o A great majority of young voters are already 
oriented towards a political party. The politi-
cal inclinations of young voters appear to be 
closely related to the political preferences 
and orientations of their families. Political 
marketers need to develop long-term strate-
gies and accordingly make long-term invest-
ments in the market in order to be able to 
change voter preferences, because in such 
markets that consist of voters with higher 
political drives and strong party images, par-
ty perceptions are probably less changeable 
in the short-term. Therefore, it would be rel-
atively diffi  cult for parties to quickly win mar-
ket shares from other parties because voters 
for the most part do not change their prefer-
ences unless there is a strong cause, which is 
compulsory for competition and producing 
it is the responsibility of the political deci-
sion-makers.
o The Turkish political market is highly polarized 
and multi-poled, and young voters appear 
very sure and determined about the (other) 
political players in the market. The political 
decision-makers should develop strategies 
that address and satisfy the voters, especially 
those in the neighboring areas on the TPM, 
where voter transitions among parties are 
much more likely.
o Party perceptions appear to be a major factor 
in young voters’ decisions. Therefore, political 
marketers should make sure, while remain-
ing sensitive about it, that their parties have 
clearly and correctly perceived positions in 
the minds of voters. 
o Political marketers primarily have to deter-
mine how their party is perceived in the po-
litical space and compare it to the party’s (of-
fi cial) ideological position. If there is any gap 
between these two positions, this points to a 






























the messages sent to the voters and weakens 
their power, thereby producing a blurred and 
complicated image of the political product 
and never yielding the desired outcomes. In 
such a case, political marketers should de-
velop the necessary strategies for corrective 
shifts that will bring the party’s (offi  cial) ideo-
logical and perceived positions together so 
that the party can deliver clear and concise 
messages to voters.
Finally, this is a case study carried out on univer-
sity students in order to detect and represent 
voter perceptions in a political market. The fi nd-
ings are probably diffi  cult to generalize, but are 
quite suffi  cient to draw a general picture of the 
political market and to present a new approach 
to handling such an issue. Repeating the study 
on a larger sample from diff erent universities in 
diff erent regions would be both more benefi cial 
and advisable.
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